feat: server-side CSRF token validation
Introduces CsrfForm<T>: a FromRequest extractor that looks up the session's csrf_token and constant-time-compares it to a csrf_token field in the form body. Drop-in replacement for Form<T> on every state-changing /web/ POST handler. Missing or expired session → redirect to /web/login; malformed body → 400; token mismatch → 403. WebSession carries csrf_token, minted alongside the session token at login and magic-link consume. Not rotated per request — rotation would break multi-tab use and buys little over SameSite=Strict cookies. Handlers: bulk, purge-closed, reset, close, reopen, analyze, delete-recording, logout all now require CsrfForm<_>. Login stays unprotected (SameSite=Strict alone is sufficient — forced-login CSRF has no impact on this codebase). /api/... is header-auth, exempt. Constant-time compare via subtle::ConstantTimeEq avoids timing oracles on the token. Template work is NOT in this commit — browser forms still post without csrf_token, so the live web UI will 403 until Schritt 6 (templates render the hidden field). Tests: all 12 red specs in csrf_attack_test.rs now green, #[ignore] removed. Integration tests that POSTed to protected endpoints switched to a new create_router_and_session_store entrypoint which returns a handle to the store so tests can read csrf_token for the active session.
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@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ rpassword = "7.4.0"
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pulldown-cmark = { version = "0.13", default-features = false, features = ["html"] }
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strsim = "0.11"
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spellbook = "0.4.0"
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subtle = "2"
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[dev-dependencies]
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tower = { version = "0.5", features = ["util"] }
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