Files
doctate/server/src/auth.rs
T
Brummel 2e3b5efe86 feat: render CSRF token into state-changing forms
Adds the csrf_token hidden field to every POST form in the web UI
(logout, bulk, purge-closed, close, reopen, analyze, reset,
delete-recording). Login stays without a token — SameSite=Strict
already blocks the relevant attack shapes and forced-login CSRF
has no impact here.

Shape:
- New askama macro partials/csrf_field.html renders the hidden
  input; 3 templates import + {% call csrf::field(csrf_token) %}
  inside each <form method="POST">.
- AuthenticatedWebUser carries csrf_token (cloned out of the
  session once during extraction) so render handlers don't need a
  second store lookup.
- 3 template structs (MyCasesTemplate, CasePageTemplate,
  CaseRecordingsTemplate) gain the field; render sites pass
  user.csrf_token through.

Safety-net tests:
- Each rendered page must contain the exact session csrf_token in
  a hidden input — catches anyone adding a new form without the
  macro.
- Happy-path round-trip: fetch page, parse token from HTML, POST
  with token → 303. Catches drift between rendered and accepted
  token formats.
2026-04-22 10:04:21 +02:00

158 lines
4.9 KiB
Rust

use std::path::PathBuf;
use std::sync::Arc;
use std::time::Instant;
use axum::extract::{FromRef, FromRequestParts};
use axum::http::request::Parts;
use axum_extra::extract::cookie::CookieJar;
use doctate_common::API_KEY_HEADER;
use tracing::warn;
use crate::config::Config;
use crate::error::AppError;
use crate::web_session::{SESSION_COOKIE, SessionStore};
/// Truncate a session token to a non-sensitive prefix for logs.
fn token_prefix(token: &str) -> String {
token.chars().take(8).collect()
}
/// Extracted from the X-API-Key header on every authenticated request.
pub struct AuthenticatedUser {
pub slug: String,
pub role: String,
pub data_dir: PathBuf,
/// Copied from the matching entry in `users.toml` — the single
/// source of truth for how many hours of history clients see.
pub window_hours: u32,
}
impl AuthenticatedUser {
pub fn is_admin(&self) -> bool {
self.role == "admin"
}
}
impl<S> FromRequestParts<S> for AuthenticatedUser
where
S: Send + Sync,
Arc<Config>: FromRef<S>,
{
type Rejection = AppError;
async fn from_request_parts(parts: &mut Parts, state: &S) -> Result<Self, Self::Rejection> {
let config = Arc::<Config>::from_ref(state);
let api_key = parts
.headers
.get(API_KEY_HEADER)
.and_then(|v| v.to_str().ok())
.ok_or(AppError::Unauthorized)?;
let slug = config.api_keys.get(api_key).ok_or(AppError::Unauthorized)?;
let user = config
.users
.iter()
.find(|u| u.slug == *slug)
.ok_or(AppError::Unauthorized)?;
let data_dir = config.data_path.join(slug);
tokio::fs::create_dir_all(&data_dir).await?;
Ok(Self {
slug: slug.clone(),
role: user.role.clone(),
data_dir,
window_hours: user.window_hours,
})
}
}
/// Extracted from the session cookie on web UI requests.
/// On missing/expired session, returns `AppError::Redirect("/web/login")`.
pub struct AuthenticatedWebUser {
pub slug: String,
pub role: String,
pub data_dir: PathBuf,
/// Mirrors [`AuthenticatedUser::window_hours`] so the same policy
/// is available to web handlers without a second config lookup.
pub window_hours: u32,
/// Session's CSRF token. Rendered into every state-changing form
/// as a hidden field so the `CsrfForm` extractor can validate it
/// on the matching POST. Cloned out of the session record here so
/// the template handlers don't need a second store lookup.
pub csrf_token: String,
}
impl AuthenticatedWebUser {
pub fn is_admin(&self) -> bool {
self.role == "admin"
}
}
impl<S> FromRequestParts<S> for AuthenticatedWebUser
where
S: Send + Sync,
Arc<Config>: FromRef<S>,
SessionStore: FromRef<S>,
{
type Rejection = AppError;
async fn from_request_parts(parts: &mut Parts, state: &S) -> Result<Self, Self::Rejection> {
let config = Arc::<Config>::from_ref(state);
let store = SessionStore::from_ref(state);
let jar = CookieJar::from_headers(&parts.headers);
let token = jar
.get(SESSION_COOKIE)
.map(|c| c.value().to_owned())
.ok_or_else(|| AppError::Redirect("/web/login".into()))?;
// Read lock first to check validity. If expired, upgrade to write and remove.
let expired = {
let r = store.read().await;
match r.get(&token) {
Some(s) => s.expires_at <= Instant::now(),
None => {
warn!(token_prefix = %token_prefix(&token), "session lookup failed (unknown or already expired)");
return Err(AppError::Redirect("/web/login".into()));
}
}
};
if expired {
let mut w = store.write().await;
let removed = w.remove(&token);
if let Some(s) = removed {
warn!(slug = %s.slug, "session expired");
}
return Err(AppError::Redirect("/web/login".into()));
}
let r = store.read().await;
let session = r
.get(&token)
.ok_or_else(|| AppError::Redirect("/web/login".into()))?;
let data_dir = config.data_path.join(&session.slug);
// Look up the TOML user record for the policy fields the session
// does not carry. A missing record can only happen if users.toml
// was edited while a session was still live; fall back to the
// serde default so the request stays functional.
let window_hours = config
.users
.iter()
.find(|u| u.slug == session.slug)
.map(|u| u.window_hours)
.unwrap_or(72);
Ok(Self {
slug: session.slug.clone(),
role: session.role.clone(),
data_dir,
window_hours,
csrf_token: session.csrf_token.clone(),
})
}
}